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GOMEZ REDUX: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE
DEVELOPMENTS TWELVE YEARS ON
MICHAEL B. BROWDE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 1997, I participated in a symposium issue of this publication dedicated in part to the New Mexico Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Gomez1 and
its importance to the development of New Mexico’s independent state constitutional rights jurisprudence.2 Gomez began as a fairly traditional appeal from a denial of a motion to suppress the evidence seized from a vehicle without a warrant
brought under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution3 and the correlative search and seizure provision in article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.4 The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, ruling against
Gomez’s Fourth Amendment claim and refusing to consider his state constitutional claim for failure to preserve the issue for appellate review.5
On certiorari review, the supreme court decided that the state constitutional
issue was preserved,6 and in the process adopted its now well-entrenched “interstitial” approach to the analysis of state constitutional claims when they are raised in
conjunction with “analogous” federal constitutional claims—i.e., those constitutional rights that are similarly provided in both documents.7 Under that interstitial
approach the court will determine the federal constitutional rights claim first, and
will only move on to the state constitutional claim if the federal provision does not
* Michael Browde is a 1968 graduate of the Georgetown University Law Center. He was a regular
member of the UNM law faculty for thirty years and remains active as an Emeritus Professor.
1. 1997-NMSC-006, 932 P.2d 1.
2. The symposium, entitled “State Constitutional Law Symposium,” included the following articles
focused on Gomez: Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L.
REV. 199 (1998) (embracing an independent state constitutional rights jurisprudence, more broadly than in
Gomez); Jennifer Cutcliffe Juste, Note, The Effect of State Constitutional Interpretation on New Mexico’s Civil
and Criminal Procedure—State v. Gomez, 28 N.M. L. REV. 355 (1998) (elaborating on the Gomez interstitial
approach as applied to the search and seizure context); Robert F. Williams, New Mexico State Constitutional
Law Comes of Age, 28 N.M. L. REV. 379 (1998) (explaining the historical significance of Gomez); and Michael
B. Browde, State v. Gomez and the Continuing Conversation over New Mew Mexico’s State Constitutional
Rights Jurisprudence, 28 N.M. L. REV. 387 (1998) (raising some concerns about the Gomez analysis).
3. The relevant portion of the Fourth Amendment provides: “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. The relevant portion of the New Mexico search and seizure clause provides: “no warrant to search
any place, or seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing the place to be searched, or the persons
or things to be seized, nor without a written showing of probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.”
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 10.
5. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 1, 932 P.2d at 3.
6. After considering the merits, the court affirmed the conviction, holding that the warrantless search
did not violate either the Fourth Amendment standard with respect to such searches, or the additional protections it read into article II, section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution—under which a warrantless search will
be upheld only if the state established “exigent circumstances.” Id. ¶ 46, 932 P.2d at 13. Although the state
standard provides greater privacy protection in ones automobile, the court, in State v. Bomboy, 2008-NMSC029, ¶ 12, 184 P.3d 1045, 1048, made clear that in Gomez “we did not expressly equate an automobile with a
home for search and seizure purposes.”
7. Professor Williams objects to terms like “analogous,” “related,” or “parallel” provisions, out of a
concern that such phrases may imply a subordinate status for the state constitutional provisions which may be
articulated in similar terms to federal provisions. He would merely refer to them as state constitutional rights
claims where there are also “potentially applicable” federal provisions. See Williams, supra note 2, at 379 n.5
(quoting Bruce Ledewitz, The Role of Lower State Courts in Adapting State Law to Changed Federal Interpretations, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1003, 1004 n.5 (1994)).
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afford the protection sought by the claimant.8 The parallel state constitutional right
is thus “interstitial” in that it is seen as filling a perceived gap in the protections
provided by the federal provision. As articulated in Gomez, the interpretation of
the so-called analogous state constitutional provision “may diverge from federal
precedent for [one of] three reasons: a flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics.”9
My earlier contribution to the symposium applauded the Gomez decision because a “jurisprudential approach for dealing with arguments urging the expansion
of state constitutional rights beyond those recognized under the federal constitution is of importance to a mature [state] jurisprudence.”10 That earlier article expressed some concern about Gomez’s limited bases for state diversion from federal
precedent, which, coupled with its rather strong expression of support for “uniformity” between state and federal rights,11 created an implied presumption in
favor of the federal approach.12 The earlier article also questioned whether Gomez
interstitialism should be followed in all instances.13
It is for those reasons that the prior article concluded with the observation that
“[i]n the end, Gomez interstitialism . . . must properly remain [the subject of] a
continuing conversation which matures and develops to serve us in ways which we
may not yet appreciate or understand.”14
This opportunity to continue that conversation considers some of the developments in the cases since the symposium was published. As of December, 2009,
Gomez had been cited in eighty-one New Mexico Court of Appeals decisions,
fifty-four of which were further reviewed in the New Mexico Supreme Court.15
This article deals with the most significant of the supreme court cases, and a few
cases from the court of appeals that were not subject to further review.
The focus of this article is on recent developments concerning the following
aspects of Gomez: Part II considers whether Gomez’s two-part approach to raise
and preserve for review a state constitutional claim brought in conjunction with a
parallel federal constitutional claim16 should be reconsidered;17 Part III explains
the contours of the substantive doctrine of interstitialism and offers some further
thoughts on whether it needs to be rigidly followed in all cases; and the article
concludes with some general observations about the status of Gomez after more
than a decade of application in New Mexico’s appellate courts.

8. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 9, 932 P.2d at 7. The “lockstep” approach, previously applied in New
Mexico, was fully discussed and rejected in Gomez. Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 932 P.2d at 6. The “primacy” approach, also
rejected in the Gomez court’s adoption of interstitialism, is discussed in some detail in Browde, supra note 2,
at 391 nn.21–22.
9. 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 932 P.2d at 7.
10. See Browde, supra note 2, at 387.
11. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 21, 932 P.2d at 7; Browde, supra note 2, at 399–406.
12. See Browde, supra note 2, at 392–94.
13. See id. at 406–09.
14. Id. at 409.
15. The majority of that number only reference Gomez for general principles of preservation, sometimes having nothing to do with analogous federal and state constitutional rights provisions.
16. The approach is explained in the text accompanying notes 20–21, infra.
17. Reconsideration was suggested in Justice Bosson’s recent concurrence in State v. Garcia, 2009NMSC-046, ¶ 50, 217 P.3d 1032, 1045 (Bosson, J., concurring), and is discussed in detail in the text accompanying notes 54–63, infra.
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II. THE NECESSITY OF THE GOMEZ
PRESERVATION REQUIREMENTS
Gomez came to the New Mexico Supreme Court in a posture that required the
initial resolution of whether the state constitutional question had been properly
preserved for appellate review.18 In that context, the supreme court viewed its consideration of the various methods for reviewing state constitutional rights claims as
a necessary precursor to its preservation analysis.19 It was the adoption of the interstitial approach that that led the court to establish its two modes of preservation:
one for when there is existing precedent for more expansive state protection,20 and
another when there is no such precedent.21 Since Gomez the appellate courts have
been struggling with the application of that two-part preservation approach,22 as
illustrated in the following cases.
In State v. Sarracino, the court was faced with what appeared to be both a federal and state due process challenge to the district court’s failure to provide for a
cautionary instruction regarding accomplice testimony.23 The court swept aside the
state’s claim that the defendant had failed to preserve the state constitutional issue
under the Gomez standard, holding the Gomez preservation rules inapposite because, although “the Fourteenth Amendment serves as a federal analog to Article
II, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution in providing a right to due process,
the federal practice on which Sarracino relied for his proposed instruction is
founded in rules of procedure rather than constitutional doctrine.”24
Because the court found the federal claim rooted in “rules of procedure rather
than constitutional doctrine,” it concluded “there is not an existing federal constitutional scheme from which Sarracino could urge that this Court, or the district
court, depart.”25 Under these circumstances, the court reverted to traditional pres-

18. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 1, 932 P.2d 1, 1.
19. Id. ¶¶ 14–15, 932 P.2d at 8.
20. The opinion stated:
If established precedent construes the provision to provide more protection than its federal
counterpart, the claim may be preserved by (1) asserting the constitutional principle that
provides the protection sought under the New Mexico Constitution, and (2) showing the
factual basis needed for the trial court to rule on the issue.
Id. ¶ 22, 932 P.2d at 8. The court viewed this requirement as no different from what is required with respect to
asserting a right under the federal constitution, a federal or state statute, or a common law right—i.e., the
requirement of Rule 12-216 that “litigants ‘fairly invoke’ a ruling by the trial court in order to raise that
question on appeal.” Id. (quoting Rule 12-216(A) NMRA).
21. The court explained:
[When] a state constitutional right . . . has not been interpreted differently than its federal
analog, a party also must assert in the trial court that the state constitutional provision at
issue should be interpreted more expansively than the federal counterpart and provide reasons for interpreting the state provision differently from the federal provision.
Id. ¶ 24, 932 P.2d at 8. The court concluded that Gomez was not required to meet this additional burden
because “[t]here is established New Mexico law interpreting Article II, Section 10 more expansively than the
Fourth Amendment.” Id. ¶ 24, 932 P.2d at 8.
22. While the preservation issue was not the focus of this author’s prior article, see Browde, supra note
2, at 393 n.26, the Cutcliffe Juste note gave considerable treatment to that issue. See Cutcliffe Juste, supra note
2, at 365–69.
23. See 1998-NMSC-022, ¶ 10, 964 P.2d 72, 76.
24. Id. ¶ 11, 964 P.2d at 77. In the court’s view, Sarracino only “requested a jury instruction patterned
after a federal form that specifically cautioned the jury to examine and weigh accomplice testimony ‘with
greater care and caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses.’” Id. ¶ 8, 964 P.2d at 76.
25. Id. ¶ 11, 964 P.2d at 77.
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ervation rules—i.e., that “by tendering his proposed instruction, Sarracino preserved the question whether New Mexico’s jury instructions adequately respond to
the concerns accompanying accomplice testimony, or whether New Mexico’s existing practice should be changed.”26
This may have been a narrow view of the nature of Sarracino’s federal claim,
because the “change” sought by Sarracino was his claim that both the federal and
state constitution required a more specific instruction. The court was also comfortable in its conclusion that Gomez preservation rules did not apply because in prior
rulings it had viewed the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions
as being based on “a similarity in underlying principles,” thus providing further
support for its conclusion that “there is not an existing federal constitutional
scheme from which Sarracino could urge that this Court, or the district court,
depart.”27
In New Mexico Right To Choose/NARAL v. Johnson,28 the court was dealing
with an equal protection attack on a New Mexico Human Services Department
rule restricting state funding for medically necessary abortions under the state’s
Medicaid program, as well as a similar claim under the New Mexico Equal Rights
Amendment to article II, established in section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution.29 Given the presence of clear U.S. Supreme Court precedent rejecting a Federal Equal Protection challenge to bans on such funding,30 the court easily moved
to the state constitutional issues in the case under Gomez.31 Of course, Gomez was
highly relevant to the extent the challenge was made under the “analogous” state
equal protection clause. Given, however, that the court ultimately relied on the
New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment, for which there is no federal analogue, the
court could have fairly sidestepped the Gomez preservation rules entirely32 with a
clear declaration that whenever there are no “parallel” federal and state constitutional provisions involved, the special preservation rules of Gomez do not apply.
Three other post-Gomez cases, each dealing with the consequences of failure to
meet its preservation requirement, merit some consideration. In State v. Harbison,
the supreme court was faced with the question of whether the court of appeals had
26. Sarracino, 1998-NMSC-022, ¶ 11, 964 P.2d at 77.
27. Id. This is but one example of the court adhering to a “lockstep” with federal constitutional mode
of analysis, even if the application of that method under the state constitution might provide broader protection than under federal law. This issue is discussed in more detail in the text accompanying notes 123–129,
infra. Applying that unified mode of constitutional analysis the Sarracino court resolved the defendant’s state
constitutional claim against him. See id. ¶ 12, 964 P.2d at 77.
28. 1999-NMSC-005, 975 P.2d 841. For an in-depth discussion of the federal and state issues in the case,
see Linda M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home: State Constitutions and Medicaid Funding for Abortions, 26 N.M. L.
REV. 433 (1996). See also Linda M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home Revisited: The New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment After New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 40 N.M. L. REV. 215 (2010).
29. The New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment to section 18, added the following to that section dealing with due process and equal protection: “Equality of rights under law shall not be denied on account of the
sex of any person.” N.M. CONST. art. II, § 18.
30. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (rejecting constitutional challenges to federal funding
limitations which barred payment for most medically necessary abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)
(sustaining a Connecticut regulation granting Medicaid benefits for childbirth but denying them for non-therapeutic medically unnecessary abortions).
31. NARAL, 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 28, 975 P.2d at 851.
32. The NARAL court referenced Sarracino as “discussing preservation when there is no federal constitutional scheme from which to depart,” see 1999-NMSC-005, ¶ 25, 975 P.2d at 850, despite the questionable
substantive value of that brief discussion. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.
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“erred in ‘sua sponte’ applying a federal analysis and adopting the position of the
United States Supreme Court . . . without conducting such an interstitial analysis.”33 The court answered the question in the negative after finding that the state
issue had not been briefed and argued in the court of appeals, concluding that
since the issue was abandoned “that Court was not required to conduct its own
interstitial analysis.”34 The court went on to rule that “[t]he Court of Appeals properly analyzed this case under the Fourth amendment and the relevant, binding
United States Supreme Court precedent.”35 Based upon this analysis, the New
Mexico high court affirmed the court of appeals’ decision reversing the district
court’s suppression of evidence.36
In Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools, the preservation question was ignored
entirely.37 The Breen court was confronted with a state equal protection challenge
to the differing treatment afforded to physical and emotional disability under the
state Worker’s Compensation Act. Without even a bow in the direction of the
Gomez rules for preservation, the court applied the state equal protection clause
and held that “Sections 52-1-41 and -42 of the Act violate equal protection guarantees of the New Mexico Constitution by treating mentally disabled workers differently than physically disabled workers.”38
Justice Minzner dissented, in part, on the ground that the workers had not distinguished “the protection provided by the federal constitution from that provided
by the state constitution . . . [and had not] argue[d] that they are part of a sensitive or suspect class.”39 As a result, Justice Minzner concluded, citing Gomez, that
she “would not attempt to distinguish the equal protection guaranteed by the New
Mexico Constitution from that guaranteed by the federal constitution.”40
In State v. Funderberg, a case involving a police stop of a vehicle, the court was
confronted with the questions of whether the stop, limited questioning of the
driver, and subsequent consensual search of a vehicle were constitutionally reasonable.41 The court reiterated the constant theme in its post-Gomez cases that when a
defendant does not argue that the New Mexico Constitution provides any greater
protection than the Federal Constitution, then “we assume without deciding that
both constitutions afford equal protection to individuals against unreasonable
seizures in this context, and we analyze the constitutionality of the seizure under
one uniform standard.”42
Consideration of the preservation issues dealt with or ignored in these cases
runs the risk of confusing two questions. In an appeal from a district court, raiseand-preserve rules are imperative to assure, as a matter of efficiency and good
practice, that all issues are first presented for resolution to the trial court, thereby

33. 2007-NMSC-016, ¶ 25, 156 P.3d 30, 38.
34. Id. ¶¶ 25–26, 156 P.3d at 38.
35. Id. ¶ 26, 156 P.3d at 38.
36. Id. ¶ 27, 156 P.3d at 38.
37. See 2005-NMSC-028, 120 P.3d 413.
38. Id. ¶ 2, 120 P.3d at 416.
39. Id. ¶ 55, 120 P.3d at 428 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
40. Id.
41. 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 1, 183 P.3d 922, 924. The supreme court found no constitutional violation, reversed the court of appeals, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress evidence. Id.
42. Id. ¶ 12, 183 P.3d at 926 (quoting State v. Ochoa, 2004-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 93 P.3d 1286, 1288).
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also avoiding sandbagging by one party or another.43 At the appellate level, the
matter raised in the trial court may be abandoned by failing to brief the question in
the appellate court.44
At the supreme court level, however, too rigid an application of preservation/
abandonment rules when state constitutional claims are involved may undermine
an essential function of the supreme court—to shape the constitutional principles
of the State—when an important constitutional issue is sufficiently presented in
the record. Perhaps that court ought to be able to be more proactive—identifying
the question in its grant of review, requesting the parties to brief the matter, inviting amici participation on the question where appropriate,45 asking for supplemental briefing, and perhaps even requiring reargument when the question arises late
in the proceeding.46 Indeed, Gomez did mention the possible applicability of the
“fundamental error” exception to the general rule of preservation.47
In addition, the appellate courts have recognized a further exception to the
Gomez preservation requirement. In State v. Garcia, the court was confronted with
the situation where “it was tacitly agreed that Defendant was seized at some point
during his encounter with the officer,” and the State’s response to the defense
motion to suppress was framed instead on whether there was “reasonable suspicion” for the seizure.48 The district court denied the motion, and it was only in the
court of appeals where the State claimed in its brief “that the district court [could]
be affirmed on the alternative grounds that Defendant was never seized.”49 Defendant then raised his state constitutional claim in “response to the State’s argument
for affirmance on what amounted to right-for-any reason grounds.”50 Confronted
with that procedural posture, the court held: “[W]e will not impose any preservation requirement on Defendant’s response. In this context, it was not incumbent
on Defendant to anticipate such a holding by the Court of Appeals and preserve

43. See Rule 12-216(A) NMRA (“To preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling or
decision by the district court was fairly invoked. . . .”); Madrid v. Roybal, 112 N.M. 354, 356, 815 P.2d 650,
652 (Ct. App. 1991) (“The principal purpose of the rule requiring a party to preserve error in the trial court of
issues sought to be asserted on appeal is to alert the mind of the trial judge to the claimed error and to accord
the trial court an opportunity to correct the matter.”).
44. E.g., State v. Ortiz, 90 N.M. 319, 320, 563 P.2d 113, 114 (Ct. App. 1977) (holding that issues listed in
the docketing statement but not briefed on appeal are deemed abandoned).
45. See Amicus Curiae Brief at 1, State v. Flores, 2004-NMSC-021, 135 N.M. 759, 93 P.3d 1264 (No.
27,845) (involving a resident expert responding to the supreme court request for his amicus views on constitutional procedures dealing with mental retardation and the death penalty).
46. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S.Ct. 876, 888 (2010) (noting that “[t]he case
was reargued in this Court after the Court asked the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing [a further
constitutional question].”)
47. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 31 n.4, 932 P.2d 1, 10 (“Even if Gomez’s contentions before the
trial court had failed to preserve the state constitutional claim, we could nevertheless consider it because
freedom from illegal search and seizure is a fundamental right.”). Professor Sullivan suggests, however, that
the statement may have been an exaggeration of the fundamental error doctrine, as articulated in State v.
Barber, 2004-NMSC-019, ¶ 8, 92 P.3d 633, 635. See J. Thomas Sullivan, Developing a State Constitutional Law
Strategy in New Mexico Criminal Prosecutions, 39 N.M. L. REV. 407, 416–17 (2009); see also State v. Cunningham, 2000-NMSC-009, ¶ 21, 998 P.2d 176, 182 (noting that fundamental error will be found only when there
exist “circumstances that ‘shock the conscience’ or implicate a fundamental unfairness within the system that
would undermine judicial integrity if left unchecked”).
48. 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 11, 217 P.3d 1032, 1036.
49. Id. ¶ 12, 217 P.3d at 1036–37.
50. Id. ¶ 12, 217 P.3d at 1037.
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his argument when it was not at issue before the district court.”51 The Garcia court
drew support for its ruling from the court of appeals decision in State v. Granville,52
in which that court used the right-for-any-reason doctrine to allow the defendant
to support his victory in the district court on a state constitutional ground not argued in the district court. As articulated in Granville:
As the appellee . . . Defendant was not strictly required to preserve his
arguments; we affirm if the trial court decision was right for any reason, as
long as the arguments in favor of affirmance are not fact based such that it
would be unfair to entertain them for the first time on appeal without notice to the appellant.53

Thus, Garcia and Granville establish exceptions to the Gomez preservation requirement when a defendant raises the state constitutional claim as a right-for-anyreason argument in support of his victory in the district court, and when it comes
up in response to a right-for-any-reason argument presented by the state.
Even more fundamental concerns over the Gomez preservation requirements
came to the fore in Justice Bosson’s concurring opinion in the Garcia case. Justice
Bosson joined the opinion of the court but wrote separately “to stimulate (hopefully) a dialogue regarding what we reasonably should continue to demand today—over twelve years after Gomez—to preserve a search and seizure argument
under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution.”54 He began by restating Gomez’s “bifurcated framework” for the preservation of a state constitutional claim when a federal analog provision was involved, and noted that in this
case the defendant satisfied the Gomez criteria with respect to the first standard—
where established precedent construes the state clause more broadly than its federal counterpart.55
He then criticized the court of appeals and the State in this case for reading that
Gomez standard “too narrowly” by focusing on whether the prior precedent dealt
with the precise claim, (here what is a seizure), rather than the “treatment of the
constitutional provision at issue.”56 Justice Bosson considered this reading too restrictive because “it could require litigants to meet the higher Gomez burden [applicable when there is no established precedent for an expansive construction of
the relevant state constitutional provision] each time a new argument or fact pattern under search and seizure is brought before a state court.”57
That led Justice Bosson to urge the reconsideration of the Gomez special requirements for preservation of state constitutional rights claims when made along

51. Id. The Garcia court went on to consider the federal constitutional claims before dealing with the
state constitutional claim, in accordance with Gomez interstitialism principles. See id. ¶¶ 23–35, 217 P.3d at
1039–42. The court ultimately reversed the conviction, and upheld the suppression motion, holding that the
defendant had been seized, the seizure was without reasonable suspicion, and that the evidence against the
defendant flowed from that illegal seizure. Id. ¶ 47, 217 P.3d at 1044.
52. 2006-NMCA-098, 142 P.3d 933.
53. Id. ¶ 12, 142 P.3d at 937.
54. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 50, 217 P.3d at 1045 (Bosson, J., concurring).
55. Id. ¶ 54, 217 P.3d at 1045–46.
56. Id.
57. Id. ¶ 55, 217 P.3d at 1046.
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with analogous federal rights claims.58 He came to that conclusion because of his
concern for the special duty of “New Mexico’s highest court . . . to interpret and
develop the New Mexico Constitution. In a government of dual sovereigns, it is
imperative that our state Constitution develop to its full potential and protect the
rights of our citizens where we deem federal law lacking.”59 Justice Bosson was
concerned that “[a] heightened preservation requirement for the state Constitution
would impede us from addressing legitimate state constitutional concerns.”60 Focusing more on the pressures and practicalities of trial practice, he further noted
that the court “should reject any ‘super preservation requirement’ or highly technical construction that would, in effect, hold our state Constitution hostage to the
vagaries of trial counsel competency.”61
Finally, reminiscent of the concerns expressed by the defendant in Gomez,62 he
noted that “Defendant’s bare citation to the Fourth Amendment, without more,
adequately preserved his search and seizure claim under the United States Constitution,” which led Justice Bosson to ask what may have been a rhetorical question:
“Why impose a higher burden on our state litigants to invoke our own
Constitution?”63
Justice Bosson’s invitation for a continued dialog on this subject merits serious
consideration. Indeed, he makes a persuasive case that the court should reconsider
the special preservation rules with respect to state constitutional rights claims
under Gomez interstitialism.
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION OF INTERSTITIALISM64
Despite its importance to preservation issues, Gomez interstitialism is more fundamentally concerned with the scope and application of state constitutional law,
and the role of the state supreme court in shaping state substantive law. That concern finds expression in the post-Gomez cases, including ones that touch upon the
following: the grounds for deviation from federal precedent and whether those

58. Id. ¶ 56, 217 P.3d at 1046.
59. Id. ¶ 57, 217 P.3d at 1046.
60. Id.
61. Id. This same concern was expressed by the court in Gomez:
Although we expect trial counsel to be well-advised of state constitutional law on a particular subject affecting his or her client’s interests, we also recognize that the arguments a trial
lawyer reasonably can be expected to articulate on an issue arising in the heat of trial are far
different from what an appellate lawyer may develop after reflection, research, and substantial briefing. It is impractical to require trial counsel to develop the arguments, articulate
rationale, and cite authorities that may appear in an appellate brief.
State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 31, 932 P.2d 1, 10.
62. 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 13, 932 P.2d at 5–6 (“Under this special rule [imposed by the court of appeals],
arguments in the trial court sufficed to preserve the Fourth Amendment issue but failed to preserve the
broader-protection issue. . . . Gomez argues that the requirements for preserving a state constitutional claim
should be identical to those for preserving a federal constitutional claim.”).
63. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 57, 217 P.3d at 1046 (Bosson, J., concurring). Justice Bosson also
thought it not a serious burden on the trial court to ask, if counsel cites the New Mexico Constitution, for
counsel to address that issue and explain why he or she believes the state constitution was violated. Id. ¶ 62,
217 P.3d at 1047.
64. For a recent comprehensive review of the ways in which the New Mexico Supreme Court has given
broader protection to constitutional rights than under the Federal Constitution in the criminal context, as well
as possibilities for future development, see Sullivan, supra note 47.
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grounds should be narrowly circumscribed, the nature and scope of the deviation,
and whether the Gomez construct must be rigidly followed in every instance.
A. The Grounds for Deviation from Federal Precedent
While Gomez itself seemed to state a categorical rule that allows only three
reasons for diverging from federal precedent,65 there are portions of the opinion
(albeit dealing with preservation) suggesting otherwise.66 A greater flexibility is
also supported by the court’s rationale for its divergence rule—that “state court
decisionmaking that eschews consideration of, or reliance on, federal doctrine . . . will lack the cogency that a reasoned reaction to the federal view could
provide. . . .”67
That matter was explicitly addressed by Justice Baca in State v. Paul T.68 Paul T.
involved a police “pat down” of a minor, under sixteen, followed by a search of his
pockets in the context of a violation of a local curfew ordinance that required that
the minor be taken into custody for release to his parents.69 The court ruled against
the search on article II, section 10 grounds,70 occasioning a dissent by Justice Baca,
who thought the police officer had acted reasonably.71
While Justice Baca took issue with the majority’s substantive resolution of the
case, he began with the observation that in applying Gomez interstitialism, “the
state court may consider various reasons for departing from federal constitutional
interpretations . . . [including] the . . . non-exclusive criteria [recited in
Gomez].”72 Justice Baca noted that “the majority’s analysis fails to properly ad-

65. “A state court adopting this approach may diverge from federal precedent for three reasons: a
flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state characteristics.” Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 19, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (citing Developments in the Law—The Interpretation
of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1359 (1982)).
While most of the cases deal with the latter two grounds for deviation, our appellate courts have not been
bashful about taking issue with the U.S. Supreme Court’s analysis under the applicable federal constitutional
provision, although reliance on “flawed federal analysis” is often cited in conjunction with one of the other
two. So, for example in State v. Rodarte, 2005-NMCA-141, ¶ 1, 125 P.3d 647, 647, the court held that “the
greater privacy protections afforded by Article II, Section 10 . . . do not permit arrests for non-jailable offenses on the basis of probable cause alone . . . siding with the four dissenting justices of the United States
Supreme Court. . . .” The court did so in part because the dissenting view in the U.S. Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence is “most consistent with prior New Mexico cases interpreting Article II, Section 10.” Id. ¶ 14,
125 P.3d at 650.
66. See Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 23 & n.3, 932 P.2d at 8. In State v. Perry, 2009-NMCA-052, 207 P.3d
1185, the court of appeals went beyond the three Gomez criteria for deviation and suggested that the defendant did not show (but perhaps might have shown) “other evidence or argument to support his theory that
additional state constitutional requirements [beyond technical compliance with the Miranda warnings] are
necessary in order to preserve the right to remain silent . . . [such as] a survey of other states to determine if
they have clarification requirements. . . .” Id. ¶ 30, 207 P.3d at 1194.
67. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 21, 932 P.2d at 7 (quoting The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, supra note 65, at 1357).
68. 1999-NMSC-037, 993 P.2d 74.
69. Id. ¶ 3, 993 P.2d at 77; see also ALAMOGORDO, N.M., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 11-03-040 (1960).
70. Paul T., 1999-NMSC-037 ¶¶ 14–15, 993 P.2d at 79.
71. Id. ¶ 38, 993 P.2d at 85 (Baca, J., dissenting).
72. Id. ¶ 35, 993 P.2d at 84. Those criteria include “1) a flawed federal analysis; 2) distinctive state
characteristics; or 3) an undeveloped federal analog.” Id. In a footnote, Justice Baca noted the additional
factors for deviation suggested by Justice Handler’s famous concurring opinion in State v. Hunt, 450 A.2d 952,
965–67 (N.J. 1982) (Handler, J., concurring). For more extensive treatment of the Handler opinion, see Sullivan, supra note 47, at 451–60.
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dress these or any other criteria justifying its holding,”73 which led him to conclude
“it is the Court’s duty to provide a principled basis for its interpretation of Article
II, Section 10” because, in his view, “[a] more comprehensive treatment would aid
in the development of New Mexico’s state constitutional jurisprudence, help further refine the application of the interstitial approach, and provide the bar and
other jurists in New Mexico with structured guidance.”74 Thus, Justice Baca made
clear that reasons for deviation from federal precedent are critical to a substantive
application of Gomez interstitialism; that there is nothing exclusive about the
Gomez factors; and that in applying interstitialism, the only real concern is that the
court “provide a principled basis” for its deviation.
Rather than focusing on these overarching purposes for deviation, a number of
recent cases have adhered to the three reasons articulated in Gomez, and then
stretched them, sometimes to the breaking point. So, for example, in a highly controversial case involving the denial of an extradition petition by the State of Ohio,
the court in Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz made expansive use of the Gomez substantive principle.75 In defense of its conclusion that Reed was not subject to return to
Ohio under the Extradition Clause of the U.S. Constitution,76 the court concluded,
based on the record before it, that Reed fled Ohio because of fear that his parole
would be revoked without due process, and that he would thereafter be returned
to prison where he faced the threat of bodily injury.77 On that basis, the court ruled
that “duress” negated his status as a fugitive under the Extradition Clause of Article IV.78
In so ruling, the court adopted an expansive view of the “structural difference”
ground for deviation articulated in Gomez. After reading the federal law as allowing the asylum state to engage in an inquiry about what might occur in the state
demanding return, the court held:
[T]he extradition process was not meant to abrogate the New Mexico Constitution which regards “seeking and obtaining safety” as a “natural, inherent and inalienable” right. See N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4. . . .“In interpreting
the more expansive language of Article II, Section 4, we are mindful of the
more intimate relationship existing between a state government and its
people, as well as the more expansive role states traditionally have played
in keeping and maintaining the peace within their borders.”79

73. Paul T., 1999-NMSC-037, ¶ 36, 993 P.2d at 84 (Baca, J., dissenting).
74. Id. ¶ 37, 993 P.2d at 85.
75. 1997-NMSC-055, 947 P.2d 86, rev’d, New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz v. Reed, 524 U.S. 151 (1998).
76. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.”).
77. See Reed, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶¶ 26–28, 54, 947 P.2d at 92–93, 97.
78. See id. ¶ 107, 947 P.2d at 108. In the pithy words of Justice Franchini, writing for the court, “The
focus of our analysis is whether Reed is a ‘fugitive from justice’ . . . [and] [t]he facts demonstrate conclusively that Ohio’s conduct toward Reed was not just. Reed is thus not a fugitive from justice. Rather, he is a
refugee from injustice.” Id. ¶ 86, 947 P.2d at 103.
79. Id. ¶ 105, 947 P.2d at 107–08 (quoting California First Bank v. State, 111 N.M. 64, 76, 801 P.2d 646,
658 (1990)). Justice Minzner concurred in the judgment, but would have based her affirmance not on the
fugitive question, which she believed expanded “the role of an asylum state beyond acceptable limits” in
violation of the Supremacy Clause. Id. ¶ 128, 947 P.2d at 112 (Minzner, J., concurring). Justice Baca dissented
on the very grounds which led the U.S. Supreme Court to reverse the New Mexico Supreme Court judgment.
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Justice Franchini’s opinion not only gave a broad reading to the Inherent Rights
Clause of the New Mexico Constitution,80 which knows no federal constitutional
parallel,81 but also articulated what may be an all-encompassing basis for deviation
from federal precedent under Gomez—i.e., that the relationship between state
government and its citizens is closer than the relationship that exists between the
federal government and citizens. If that was sufficient to satisfy the “structural
differences” prong of Gomez deviation in this case, then there are always grounds
for deviation with respect to constitutional right claims, because, by definition,
such claims seek to protect state citizens from state governmental encroachment.
The court took a similar approach in Montoya v. Ulibarri.82 In that case, the
court concluded that “protections afforded by the New Mexico Constitution allow
a prisoner to obtain habeas relief based upon a freestanding claim of actual innocence, independent of any constitutional violation at trial . . . [because] the continued incarceration of an innocent person is contrary to both due process
protections and the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment within the New Mexico Constitution.”83
Noting the federal law to the contrary, and finding that the petitioner had preserved the state constitutional question under the Gomez standard,84 the court departed from federal precedent on two of the three Gomez grounds—structural
differences, and distinctive state characteristics.85 Concluding that the federal precedent refusing to entertain a freestanding claim of actual innocence in a federal
habeas petition was based in part on the fact that “federal courts are not forums in
which to relitigate state trials,”86 the Ulibarri court reiterated the particular applicability of the essential structural difference that always adheres when federal
courts and state courts are confronted with newly-expansive constitutional rights
arguments:
Rather than being concerned with principles of federalism, the New Mexico
Constitution is obligated to protect our State’s sovereignty. Intrinsic within
state sovereignty is an interest protecting the credibility of the state judiciary. This Court has a particular interest in ensuring accuracy in criminal
convictions in order to maintain credibility within the judiciary.87

Compare id. ¶¶ 151–56, 947 P.2d at 120–21 (Baca, J., dissenting), with New Mexico ex rel. Ortiz, 524 U.S. at
153–55.
80. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“All persons are born equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and
inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining safety and happiness.”). For a more in depth discussion of that clause, see Marshall J. Ray, What Does the Natural Rights Clause Mean to New Mexico?, 39 N.M.
L. REV. 375 (2009).
81. Which raises the question whether Gomez interstitialism even applied in this instance. See supra
notes 66–72 and accompanying text.
82. 2007-NMSC-035, 163 P.3d 476.
83. Id. ¶ 1, 163 P.3d at 478. The court, however, affirmed the district court denial of the petition holding that the habeas petitioner can only “obtain relief if he can establish by clear and convincing evidence that
no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of new evidence,” and because “[p]etitioner has failed
to meet this standard.” Id.
84. Id. ¶ 18, 163 P.3d at 482.
85. Id. ¶ 19, 163 P.3d at 482–83.
86. Id. ¶ 16, 163 P.3d at 482 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 401 (1993)).
87. Id. ¶ 21, 163 P.3d at 483 (internal citations omitted).
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The “federalism” concern, articulated here and in Reed, relates to the often
expressed reality that when federal constitutional constraints are established, those
new rights apply nationwide. Such a result necessarily brings to a halt one of the
key strengths in our federal system—the ability of the states to serve as “laboratories,” be it in the economic sphere,88 or with respect to individual rights.89 Again,
that reality is a constant, so if federalism values are to be a sufficient “structural
difference” for Gomez deviation purposes, then there is very little, if anything, left
to Gomez’s narrowly articulated grounds for deviation.
The Ulibarri court also recited the second Gomez factor—distinctive state characteristics—for departure from federal precedent, and relied for compliance with
that standard on the fact that “this Court has concluded [in numerous instances]
that the New Mexico Constitution provides greater rights to New Mexico defendants than those rights provided in the federal constitution.”90 That mode of analysis
both overlaps with “structural differences” and, on its own, suggests a very broad
principle—that the numerous instances of state constitutional deviation from federal precedent is a sufficient “distinctive state characteristic” that permits deviation in any future case.91
Such expansive views of “structural difference” or “distinct state characteristics” are not faithful to the Gomez principle of “reasoned reaction to the Federal
view,”92 or Justice Baca’s formulation that the reason given be consistent with “the
Court’s duty to provide a principled basis” for its conclusion.93 Both Reed and
Ulibarri, however, may be read as dealing with unique matters of “structural differences.” Reed involved a particular state constitutional provision involving the
“seeking and obtaining safety”94—of particular relevance to his claim of asylum
immunity from extradition; and Ulibarri, which arose in the habeas corpus context
that requires federal deference to state fact-finding,95 also presents a special state-

88. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of
the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
89. See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980) (holding that the Federal Constitution does not limit California’s “sovereign right to adopt in its own constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution.”).
90. Because of their particular relevance to the issue in the case, the court focused primarily on its
more expansive interpretation of New Mexico’s Due Process Clause of article II, section 18, and Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of article II, section 13. Ulibarri, 2007-NMSC-035 ¶¶ 23–24, 163 P.3d 476, 484
(citing State v. Vallejos, 1997-NMSC-040, ¶¶ 35–38, 945 P.2d 957, 967–68 (New Mexico Due Process Clause)
and State v. Rueda, 1999-NMCA-033, ¶¶ 9–14, 975 P.2d 351, 353–54 (New Mexico Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause)).
91. See, e.g., State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 2001-NMSC-017, ¶ 15, 25 P.3d 225, 231 (“The extra layer of
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures involving automobiles is a distinct characteristic of New
Mexico constitutional law.”); State v. Ochoa, 2009-NMCA-002, ¶ 12, 206 P.3d 143, 148 (“We depart from
federal constitutional law in this case [refusing to recognize a constitutional challenge to pretextual stops]
because we find the federal analysis unpersuasive and incompatible with our state’s distinctively protective
standards for searches and seizures of automobiles.”).
92. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 21, 932 P.2d 1, 7.
93. State v. Paul T., 1999-NMSC-037, ¶ 36, 993 P.2d 74, 85 (Baca, J., dissenting).
94. Reed v. State ex rel. Ortiz, 1997-NMSC-055, ¶ 103, 947 P.2d 86, 107; see also N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 4.
95. In addition to its reliance on its sovereign need to “protect the credibility of the state judiciary,” see
text accompanying supra note 87, the Ulibarri court also relied on the “state interest in insuring accuracy and
the superior ability of our state courts to make accurate factual findings.” 2007-NMSC-035, ¶ 21, 163 P.3d at
483.
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sovereignty related concern. In such circumstances, however, the judicial invocation of “special state circumstances” ought to avoid an overly broad statement that
suggests a result-oriented, less-reasoned approach.
B. The Subject Matter of the Deviation from Federal Precedent
Related to the issues surrounding the reasons for deviation, the post-Gomez
cases raise questions concerning to what the deviation principle applies. In the
preservation context, as Justice Bosson pointed out in his Garcia concurrence,
there has been some dispute over whether prior deviation under the first prong of
Gomez preservation (where established precedent exists) must be with respect to
the particular state constitutional clause involved, or more narrowly as that clause
is sought to be applied to the particular facts of the new case.96
That problem is illustrated in some of the cases dealing with the substantive
aspects of Gomez. State v. Nunez,97 where the court applied Gomez in the double
jeopardy context, is one example. The defendants had suffered the forfeiture of
their vehicle by way of a default judgment in conjunction with criminal drug
charges.98 When the narcotics prosecutions were subsequently brought, the defendants argued that “because they had already been penalized by the forfeiture,
double jeopardy prevented further prosecution.”99 That claim was denied, and they
were convicted.100 On appeal, the supreme court reversed.101 In the first step of its
Gomez interstitialism analysis, the supreme court concluded that the Federal
Double Jeopardy Clause did not prevent the prosecution after the forfeiture, because the U.S. Supreme Court “in a singular reversal of its recent double-jeopardy
jurisprudence,” had held that “‘in rem civil forfeitures are neither ‘punishment’
nor criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause,’” thereby eliminating
any double-jeopardy ground for dismissing civil forfeiture cases under the U.S.
Constitution.102 Moving on to the second part of its substantive Gomez analysis,
the court held as follows:
[W]e justify our departure from federal constitutional doctrine because of
the distinctive characteristics of New Mexico’s double-jeopardy and forfeiture jurisprudence. . . . New Mexico has a time-honored precedent that
has always regarded forfeiture as punitive. Moreover, the New Mexico and
federal double-jeopardy protections are facially different and, recently, our
double-jeopardy case law has departed from the federal standard. . . . [W]ere we to follow [the federal precedent], we would be in conflict with, and would be required to dismantle, a significant body of settled
law, much of which was decided independently of federal case law.103

96. See supra notes 54–63 and accompanying text.
97. 2000-NMSC-013, 2 P.3d 264.
98. Id. ¶ 1, 2 P.3d at 269.
99. Id. ¶ 12, 2 P.3d at 271.
100. Id.
101. Id. ¶¶ 117–18, 2 P.3d at 293. The consolidated appellate cases were heard in the first instance in the
supreme court because the court of appeals certified the cases to that court pursuant to NMSA 1978, § 34-514(C) (1972).
102. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, ¶ 16, 2 P.3d at 272 (quoting United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 292
(1996)).
103. Id. ¶ 17, 2 P.3d at 272 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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Justice Serna, joined by Justice Baca in dissent, thought the majority’s rationale
a “misleading” application of the appropriate Gomez factors for diverting from
federal precedent.104 In Justice Serna’s view, the prior state opinion relied on by
the majority—State ex rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy105—only involved the double jeopardy protection against “multiple punishments,” rather than the double jeopardy
protection against a second prosecution at issue in this case.106 Justice Serna concluded that “in respect to multiple punishments, ‘our analysis is identical for both
the federal and state clause,’”107 and the Schwartz court reserved for another day
whether “the New Mexico Double Jeopardy Clause, under circumstances other
than the multiple punishment doctrine, provides greater protection than the federal clause.”108 The dissent found no suggestion “in the reported New Mexico case
law that the New Mexico double jeopardy clause, in the multiple punishment context, provides further protection than that afforded by the federal clause as interpreted by relevant federal case law.”109 Thus, the majority and the dissent were
essentially split over whether Gomez deviation should be evaluated by reference
to the clause involved (the majority), or the more specific claim involving the
clause (the dissent).
In addition, the subsequent cases expose a further question in this area, best
illustrated by Breen v. Carlsbad Municipal Schools,110 where the court again engaged in an extensive application of interstitialism. Confronted with an equal protection challenge to the differing treatment afforded to physical and emotional
disability under the state Worker’s Compensation Act, the court, applying the state
equal protection clause, held that “Sections 52-1-41 and -42 of the Act violate
equal protection guarantees of the New Mexico Constitution by treating mentally
disabled workers differently than physically disabled workers.”111
The court applied the federal mode of analysis to the equal protection challenge, as it has historically done,112 determining whether the level of scrutiny need
be strict, middle-tier, or mere rationality. The Breen court only implicitly acknowledged that a federal claim would fail under middle-tier analysis,113 and then went
on to independently apply middle-tier analysis under the state constitution. In doing so, and with heavy reliance on the historical underpinnings of the Americans
104. Id. ¶ 140, 2 P.3d at 298 (Serna, J., dissenting).
105. 120 N.M. 619, 904 P.2d 1044 (1995).
106. See Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, ¶¶ 140–41, 2 P.3d at 298 (Serna, J., dissenting). Justice Serna relied on
the fact that the double jeopardy clause protects against three distinct abuses. In addition to preventing multiple punishment, it also protects against “a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal” and “a
second prosecution for the same offense after conviction.” Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 625–26, 904 P.2d at 1050–51.
107. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, ¶ 141, 2 P.3d at 298 (Serna, J., dissenting) (quoting Schwartz, 120 N.M. at
625, 904 P.2d at 1050).
108. Schwartz, 120 N.M. at 625, 904 P.2d at 1050.
109. Nunez, 2000-NMSC-013, ¶ 141 (Serna, J., dissenting) (quoting Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 7 n.3,
810 P.2d 1227 (1991)).
110. 2005-NMSC-028, 120 P.3d 413.
111. Id. ¶ 2, 120 P.3d at 416.
112. See, e.g., Richardson v. Carnegie Library Rest., Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 693, 763 P.2d 1153, 1158 (1988),
overruled on other grounds by Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 1998-NMSC-031, 965 P.2d 305.
113. Without explicitly acknowledging that the U.S. Supreme Court had refused to extend middle-tier
scrutiny to the mentally disabled in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Breen
court noted that in prior cases “[w]e have looked to federal case law for the basic definitions for the threetiered approach, but we have applied those definitions to different groups and rights than the federal courts.”
2005-NMSC-028, ¶ 14, 120 P.3d at 418–19.
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with Disability Act,114 and the special protections afforded the mentally disabled
under New Mexico law,115 the Breen court concluded “it is appropriate to apply
intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on mental disability because such
persons are a sensitive class,”116 and that the sections of the Workers’ Compensation Act that limit “the compensation for mentally disabled workers compared to
physically disabled workers . . . violate equal protection by discriminating against
the mentally disabled in violation of equal protection guarantees.”117
Breen accepted the federal method of equal protection analysis, thus adopting a
kind of “lock-step” approach with respect to federal constitutional analytic methodology, if not result. In this instance, it did so by first deciding whether the personal interest involved required strict scrutiny, middle-tier review, or merely
rational basis review—the mode of equal protection analysis developed in federal
law.118 That same approach seems to predominate in many constitutional areas—
especially those involving the open-ended clauses of due process and equal protection. So, for example, in the procedural due process area, the New Mexico Supreme Court has relied heavily on the Mathews v. Eldridge119 balance, although
deviating from the federal approach on how to strike that balance in a particular
case.120
In both instances—equal protection and due process—there have been principled arguments that the federal mode of analysis is, itself, lacking in some ways.
So, for example, in his famous dissent in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez, Justice Marshall argued that “[t]he Court apparently seeks to establish today that equal protection cases fall into one of two neat categories which
dictate the appropriate standard of review—strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But
this Court’s decisions in the field of equal protection defy such easy categorization.”121 Similarly, in the due process field, Professor Mashaw has been critical of
the Mathews balancing test as an appropriate analytical approach.122
That is not to say that after considered judgment on the matter the court might
be disposed to adopt a particular federal analytic approach, after presentation of
those issues through briefs and arguments of counsel. Until that occurs, however,
the court should be mindful—when applying its interstitial approach—of the need
to evaluate federal modes or methods of analyzing constitutional rights, just as it
currently evaluates how those modes of analysis are applied under federal law. To
assist that effort, counsel invoking interstitialism should not limit their claims to
the substantive component of the rights involved, or the application of federal

114. 2005-NMSC-028, ¶¶ 23–24, 120 P.3d at 421–22 (discussing the Americans with Disability Act).
115. See id. ¶ 27, 120 P.3d at 422.
116. Id. ¶ 28, 120 P.3d at 423.
117. Id. ¶ 50, 120 P.3d at 427.
118. Id. ¶¶ 11–19, 120 P.3d at 418–23.
119. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
120. See State v. Vallejos, 1997-NMSC-040, ¶¶ 35–38, 945 P.2d 957, 967–68. But see Scanlon v. Las
Cruces Public Schools, 2007-NMCA-150, ¶ 23, 172 P.3d 185, 192 (refusing to provide greater due process
protections to students subject to school disciplinary hearings under the state constitution than provided under
the federal constitution).
121. 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
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methodology, but should also consider challenging the federal mode of constitutional analysis as well.
C. When Interstitialism Need Not Be Rigidly Followed
The earlier article, to which this piece is intended as a reprise, suggested that
there may be instances when Gomez interstitialism ought not apply.123 In considering that notion again, one must start with the underlying reason Gomez jettisoned
the prior “lockstep” approach to state constitutional adjudication. As most recently put by Justice Bosson:
As New Mexico’s highest court, it is our duty and privilege to interpret and
develop the New Mexico Constitution. In a government of dual sovereigns,
it is imperative that our state Constitution develop to its full potential and
protect the rights of our citizens where we deem federal law lacking.124

That solemn “duty and privilege,” is taken so seriously by the court, that even
when justices disagree on the application of broader protection than the federal
standard, they can insist on the separation of federal and state constitutional doctrine. Thus, in his dissent in State v. Nyce, Justice Serna chided the majority for
combining the federal and state analysis of the probable cause issue presented in
that case.125 The majority had reversed the conviction, holding that the affidavit
which formed the basis of a search warrant did not establish probable cause.126
Much of the discussion of the legal standard in the context of a search of a home
intertwined the discussion of federal cases and a number of state cases, suggesting
that the constitutional standards in this context are the same with respect to both
constitutions.127
Justice Serna disagreed with the reversal of the conviction,128 but in the process,
pointed out that the court should always adhere to the State v. Gomez interstitial
approach and clearly distinguish the state law, once the federal claim was decided
against the litigant, because:
Applying independent and adequate state law to a defendant’s motion to
suppress could likely create a different outcome than applying federal law
(such as the application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule), which is why a separate analysis and conclusion regarding these two
distinct approaches is important.129
123. See Browde, supra note 2, at 406–09.
124. State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 57, 217 P.3d 1032, 1046 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
125. See 2006-NMSC-026, ¶ 31, 137 P.3d 587, 596–97.
126. Id. ¶ 1, 137 P.3d at 589. The court concluded that the suspicious buying activities of the defendant:
[D]id not give rise to probable cause to search the Cook residence. Because no other information was presented in the affidavit to confirm the officers’ suspicions and establish the
crucial link to the residence to be searched, the affidavit was insufficient. The warrant was
therefore unconstitutionally defective, and the evidence seized as a result of the search
should have been suppressed.
Id. ¶ 28, 137 P.3d at 596.
127. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 11–12, 137 P.3d at 591–92.
128. He would have affirmed the district court and the court of appeals because, in his view, “the affidavit presented by law enforcement satisfied the probable cause standard and . . . there was a sufficient nexus
between the affidavit’s allegations and the house searched.” Id. ¶ 31, 137 P.3d at 597 (Serna, J., dissenting).
129. Id. ¶ 31, 137 P.3d at 596–97.
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If the court in Nyce confused federal and state constitutional law principles, the
court also has at times veered in the opposite direction, applying state constitutional analysis without finally resolving the federal constitutional claim before it.
An example of this is State v. Paul T., a case involving a police “pat down” of a
minor, under sixteen, followed by a search of his pockets, after a violation of a
local curfew ordinance that required that the minor be taken into custody for release to his parents.130 The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the pat down, but
held the search of the minor’s pockets unreasonable under the circumstances, and
also not sustainable as a search incident to an arrest.131 After reviewing the federal
law and concluding that “[i]t is not clear whether [the Supreme] Court would extend [the relevant holding] to this case,” the Paul T. court concluded:
Because of this gap in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, together with the
possibility that the Fourth Amendment does not protect Paul in the circumstances of this case, we turn to Article II, Section 10 to resolve the issue of
whether Officer Serna’s emptying of Paul’s pockets was lawful as analogous
to a search incident to arrest.132

The court then ruled against the search on article II, section 10 grounds,133 thereby
suggesting that it is a sufficient ground to move to the state constitutional issue
when the federal law is unclear. Indeed, the uncertainty of federal law was expressly relied on in State v. Garcia as sufficient grounds to proceed to consideration of the state constitutional claim.134
IV. CONCLUSION
As we approach the mid-point of Gomez’s second decade, there is no question
that the interstitialism it brought us is now a maturing jurisprudence. Not surprisingly, the subsequent cases demonstrate that our appellate judges do not agree
entirely on the meaning of Gomez, how the case should be applied, and even
whether the case need be applied in all instances. The classic example is State v.
Cardenas-Alvarez,135 where the court split three ways. The majority found that the
border search did not violate federal law, but did violate the state constitutional
search and seizure standards.136 Justice Baca concurred, but only because he believed the state constitutional standard was violated not at the site, but instead
when state officials introduced the evidence seized in violation of those stan-

130. 1999-NMSC-037, ¶¶ 3–6, 993 P.2d 74, 77.
131. Id. ¶ 2, 993 P.2d at 77. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for “a factual determination
of voluntariness” and full consideration of whether the otherwise invalid search was consented to by the child.
Id.
132. Id. ¶ 12, 993 P.2d at 78–79 (citing State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 19–20, 22–23, 932 P.2d 1,
7–8).
133. Id. ¶¶ 14–15, 993 P.2d at 79–80.
134. See 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 25, 217 P.3d 1032, 1040 (“[T]here is serious uncertainty regarding whether
the U.S. Supreme Court would suppress the evidence in this case under the Fourth Amendment’s protections . . . because, under our interstitial analysis, we will consider preserved state constitutional claims if the
defendant is not protected under the federal constitution, we now proceed to determine whether the evidence
against Defendant was unlawfully acquired . . . under Article II, Section 10.”).
135. 2001-NMSC-017, 25 P.3d 225.
136. Id. ¶¶ 7–22, 25 P.3d at 228–34.
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dards.137 Chief Justice Serna concurred, but disagreed on the federal law. He concluded that the court was not bound by the Tenth Circuit reading of the federal
law, and had an obligation to interpret the federal law on its own. In his view, the
federal constitutional standard was violated by the border search.138
As Gomez continues to be argued and applied, the courts will surely come to
grips with whether it improperly complicates preservation, how the grounds for
deviation from federal precedents will take shape, whether Gomez analysis extends beyond the substantive content of the constitutional right involved to the
procedural mode of analysis used by the federal courts, and whether there will be
circumstances where the court will find itself compelled to speak on state constitutional rights issues wholly unconstrained by the Gomez doctrine. Perhaps that is as
it should be, especially with respect to rules that are “instruments for doing justice
and not an end in themselves.”139 And so . . . may the conversation continue!

137. See id. ¶ 55, 25 P.3d at 248 (Baca, J., concurring).
138. See id. ¶¶ 57–81, 25 P.3d at 248–57. For an in-depth treatment of Cardenas-Alvarez, see Rebecca N.
Turner, Note, Search and Seizure Law: State v. Cardenas-Alvarez: The Jurisdictional Reach of State Constitutions—Applying State Search and Seizure Standards to Federal Agents, 32 N.M. L. REV. 531 (2002).
139. State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 30, 932 P.2d 1, 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Garcia v. La Farge, 119 N.M. 532, 541, 893 P.2d 428, 437 (1995)).

